Chapter 3

Trusting Is Believing

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My daughter asked me if I could pick up my grandson from school yesterday, and, after checking my calendar, I said "Sure." If she trusts me to pick up her son, doesn't she also believe that I will? It is hard for me to make sense of the idea that she could trust me without also believing that I will do what I say in this instance or, to put it a little differently, that she believes I am trustworthy in this instance. Yet, many philosophers have argued that trust can come without belief, or, as some put it, the kind of "holding true" in the context of trust differs from the kind of "holding true" in the context of belief.[1]

The primary reason for this proposed cleavage is that many view the norms governing belief as different from the norms governing trust. The idea that there can be good reasons to trust that are non-evidential is met with little resistance; we don't trust people simply based on their track record, or on evidence that points to their trustworthiness; trusting is different from prediction. I also trust you because it is good for our relationship, because I love you, or because my trust helps to instill confidence in you; trust can be therapeutic.[2] Not only do we trust for such reasons, these value-related reasons are taken, by many, to be genuine and good reasons to trust. The idea that there can be genuine, value-related reasons for believing, however, is met with much more resistance and skepticism. It is widely held that the only genuine reasons for believing are evidential, or alethic: if my belief is based on a non-evidential reason (if such a thing is even possible) then such a belief must be defective. These considerations lead us to a puzzle that will be the focus of this chapter. Consider this triad of initially plausible propositions:

i. I trust someone to *y* only if I believe that they will *y*.
ii. There can be good non-evidential reasons to trust someone to *y*.
iii. There cannot be good non-evidential reasons to believe someone will *y*.

While there may be no logical inconsistency in holding all three, there is a tension or instability. If trusting and believing come together, it is hard to make sense of the possibility of trusting for non-evidential reasons if I cannot believe for such reasons. The most common response to this puzzle is to reject (i), to argue that trust should not be viewed as a doxastic state but rather as primarily an affective one. Yet, given how closely linked the two are, others have argued that (ii) ought to be rejected. Pamela Hieronymi has been one of the most influential defenders of this view which she calls a "purist's notion of trust," which states that "one trusts another to do something to the degree that one harbours a trusting belief that the other will do that thing. Like any belief, this trusting belief (if it is supported by reasons at all) can only be supported by reasons which one takes to bear on its truth" (Hieronymi 2008, 235). I will discuss these two responses before offering my own, which is to reject (iii). What we learn from reflection on trust is that the norms governing belief are not purely evidential or alethic. The kinds of cases that are pointed to as "justified" or "rational" trusting against the evidence reveal that some non-evidentially based beliefs can also be rationally permissible. I will conclude by considering and raising concerns about two other ways to respond to the puzzle: reject the idea that "trust" is univocal, or carefully distinguish between "fit-related" and "value-related" reasons.

Before beginning our tour of possible responses, I offer a few preliminary remarks about the scope of this discussion, and some assumptions I am making. First, I am interested, primarily, in interpersonal trust, though I think much of what I say can be generalized to trusting governments or institutions. Second, following others, I will here think about trust centrally as a three-part relation: *x* trusts *y* to *p*, and also as restricted to particular domains. Some may want to resist this idea and think of the primary form of trust as a two-part relation, as being more like love. If we are in a loving relationship, I don't love you in one domain but not another, and it doesn't even make sense to say I love you to *p*.[3] One strategy for rejecting (i) could be to argue that a trusting relationship similarly does not mean that one has particular beliefs about the person. When one talks about "trust in God," for example, this seems to denote a general attitude, not a specific belief. Yet we also sometimes talk about "believing in" a person, which goes beyond believing a set of propositions about the person. I will not here engage with this proposal. Our puzzle arises most clearly in just those cases where someone trusts someone to do a particular thing on a particular occasion. Third, it is important to distinguish trust from "mere" reliance. We rely on objects, but there is something off about feeling betrayed or resenting an object.[4] To trust someone requires making yourself vulnerable to them, where feelings of being let down and hurt can be appropriate.[5] Given these observations, Richard Holton concludes that "trust is reliance from the participant stance" (Holton 1994, 66). For example,

if my colleague always prints the handouts, I may *rely* on the fact that he will in a way that does not constitute trusting that he will. If I actually trust him to do it, this comes along with reactive attitudes that are not present in mere reliance. If I am merely relying on him to make the copies because this is the usual state of affairs, I would not be betrayed if he failed to do so. And if I find myself irritated for his not doing it, this is a flaw in me, not him. It is because failures in cases of trust *do* constitute grounds for attitudes like resentment and anger that one can only trust people and not objects.[6]

REJECT (I): TRUSTING IS NOT BELIEVING

Karen Jones argues that trust is an "affective attitude," which she describes as follows: "To trust someone is to have an attitude of optimism about her goodwill and to have the confident expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that you are counting on her" (Jones 1996, 5–6), and that this attitude is "a distinctive way of seeing a situation" (ibid., 11).[7] Her reasons for classifying trust an affective rather than cognitive state is that she takes it as "obvious fact" "that trust can give rise to beliefs that are abnormally resistant to evidence" (ibid., 15), and that one can have justified trust against the evidence. Yet she does not think one can have justified belief against the evidence, and so justified trust and justified belief can come apart. She provides the following example of a case where she thinks the evidence clearly supports the belief that someone is trustworthy but where it is not so clear that one's lack of trust is unwarranted:

> *Salesman:* I find myself feeling suspicious of a salesman, worried that he will harm my interests, worried he is not trustworthy. Let us suppose, further, that the salesman had been recommended by a friend whose judgment in such matters I believe to be reliable. On the basis of this recommendation, I believe the salesman is trustworthy, yet I find myself unable to help viewing him with suspicion. I continue to see him as untrustworthy, though I am not prepared to abandon my belief that he is trustworthy. I cannot articulate why I view him with suspicion, except to say there is something creepy about him, something in his manner that I don't like. . . . If we think of trust and distrust as primarily beliefs it seems that . . . we would have to say that my distrust could not be justified. But it seems to me that, especially if the stakes are high, I might still be justified in following through with lines of inquiry and patterns of salience that are constitutive of distrust. This is because emotions and other affective states often do represent the world the way it is; those we are suspicious of often are untrustworthy. (Ibid., 24)[8]

This example illustrates the idea that the value of having a trusting (or non-trusting) attitude can be a good reason to have it. Whether a particular emotion is appropriate partly depends on the evidence. Suppose I am angry at my neighbor because I think he ran into my boat on a foggy day. If the fog lifts to reveal no one is in the neighbor's boat, my anger will disappear, and if it does not, then I can be rightfully criticized.[9] My anger is not fitting in such circumstances, given that there is no agent that has wronged me and so worthy of this response. Yet there can also be value-related reasons that render my anger criticizable. Even if it turns out that I was correct that my neighbor carelessly ran into my boat, other considerations can support being critical of my anger. These may include, for example, that I have a disposition to become angry too quickly, which has been detrimental to me and my relationships. If I am trying to alter this disposition, then it can be said that I ought not to have become angry despite the evidence.

Again, it is important to recognize that the evidence *does* matter in our assessing of emotions. If the person in Jones's example does follow through with "lines of inquiry and patterns of salience that are constitutive of distrust" and turns up nothing, and the salesman continues to follow through on all their promises, then their distrust ceases to be appropriate in *any* sense. Guy Longworth, building on Kant's view that "practical reasons can render trust in other people reasonable" (Longworth 2017, 253), distinguishes between trusting when there is enough positive evidence to warrant believing the person is *not* trustworthy and when the evidence is absent or inconclusive. Something is wrong about trusting in the first case, whereas trusting in the second case may well be immune to criticism if one has good value-related reasons for trusting.

Another influential defender of the view that trust can come without belief is Richard Holton, and one of the reasons he appeals to concerns the relative voluntariness of the two states. He argues that we can decide to trust while we cannot decide to believe. It is worth noting that one of the standard arguments for why we cannot believe for broadly practical reasons relies on belief's nonvoluntary nature. If I could believe "at will," I could believe for any reason I like, just as I can raise my arm for any reason I like. Yet, so the argument goes, it is clear that I cannot believe for any reason I choose: you offering me a million dollars for believing I am ten feet tall appears to be a good reason for me to believe it, and yet I cannot. So, it is concluded that beliefs cannot be responsive to practical reasons: they are governed by alethic norms and so only responsive to evidential reasons. The world determines what I believe; I have no choice in the matter. This sort of argument, which is quite widespread, claims to reveal that the nature of belief rules out the possibility of basing beliefs on non-evidential reasons. For example, in arguing that practical considerations cannot be the reasons on which beliefs are

based, Thomas Kelly says that "it is part of the nature of belief that beliefs are states which can be based on epistemic considerations but not on practical considerations" (Kelly 2002, 177).

I, and others, have critiqued this line of thought in a number of ways.[10] I do not have space here to reconstruct the various arguments opposing the view that the nature of belief precludes that one can have practical reasons for believing. Common threads in these criticisms are that this view requires a revisionist explanation of common practice, that it has an overly narrow view of what counts as a belief, and an overly demanding view of what counts as a reason. Both Susanna Rinard and Jonathan Way, for example, argue that if one takes seriously what counts as a reason according to such constitutive views, we would rarely *act* for practical reasons either.

Nonetheless, Holton views trust as something we can decide to do in a way that we cannot decide to believe. He considers the following example of someone at a trust-building exercise common to drama classes, in which one person stands in the center of a circle of people, is spun around, eyes closed, until she loses her bearings, and then, arms down and knees straight, falls backwards to be caught by the others. In this "Trust Circle,"

> there is a moment at which you weigh up whether or not to let yourself fall. . . . It feels as though you are deciding whether or not to trust. Does my decision to trust the others entail that I believe they will catch me? If it does, does this in turn mean that when I decide to trust them, I also decide to believe that they will catch me? I think not. In order to trust I do not need to believe. . . . Mightn't I be most uncertain that I will be caught, but decide to trust anyway? (Holton 1994, 63)

I would like to highlight an assumption here that I will discuss further below. Holton appears to take uncertainty as incompatible with belief; he takes it that the fact that I can trust while being "most uncertain" that I will be caught shows that I can trust without believing. The phrase "most uncertain" is ambiguous. If I believed I would not be caught, then I would not let myself fall. And if my confidence was very low, then, again, I would likely not let myself fall absent some kind of coercion of incentive. That I trust indicates that have I reached a certain level of confidence, one that, I submit, reaches the level of belief, but such confidence does not show that *no* doubt remains.

Victoria McGeer argues that decisions to trust can be appropriate even when the evidence is heavily stacked against the person being trustworthy and that these may be the times when trust is most powerful. She characterizes "substantial trust" this way: "(1) it involves making or maintaining judgements about others, or about what our behaviour should be towards them, that go beyond what the evidence supports; and (2) it renounces the

very process of weighing whatever evidence there is in a cool, disengaged, and purportedly objective way" (McGeer 2008, 240). McGeer argues that in these kinds of cases we can have hopes that the person will exercise their agential capacities and rise to meet our expectations: "Hope can take the place of belief in those cases where beliefs about another's trustworthiness are absent; and it can shore up or underwrite our trusting beliefs in those cases where they already exist and may for one reason or another come under pressure" (ibid., 243).

I fail to see why hope alone cannot be sufficient to do the job that McGeer says trust does in such cases, namely, that it can allow for those in whom we place our hope to see their potential, and to try to live up to our hopeful expectations, to think: "I want to be as she already sees me to be" (ibid., 249). McGeer (2004) has shown how hope infused in others can offer the agential scaffolding needed for those hopes to be realized. Hope and trust differ in the doxastic states connected to them. My hoping you will return my book is not subject to criticism based only on the unlikeliness that you will; appropriate hope only requires that it is possible you will return it.[11] But if I trust you to return it, this requires more investment. Getting one's hopes up is risky; it feels bad to have hopes dashed. But trust betrayed is much worse. In the kinds of cases of so-called "therapeutic trust" where, for example, parents hope that their child will keep their word, they would be disappointed if the child failed to live up to their hopes, but not betrayed. The vulnerability requirement in trust is absent, and so these cases are not best described as cases of trust; therapeutic hope would be a better description.

While the specific characterizations of trust differ among those who view it as more "emotion-like" than "belief-like," what ties them all together is they want to make room for trust being "reasonable," "rational," or "justified" in some cases where the evidence does not support believing the person is trustworthy. I will now turn to those who question this possibility.

REJECT (II): THERE ARE NO GOOD NON-EVIDENTIAL REASONS FOR TRUST

Hieronymi rejects the idea that there can be genuine value-related reasons to trust, which she makes explicit in the following passage: "The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand . . . according to which one person trusts another to do something only to the extent that the one trustingly believes that the other will do that thing" (Hieronymi 2018, 213–14). She takes for granted the view I briefly discussed above, and which she has

defended in earlier (and later) papers,[12] namely, that you cannot believe for reasons that you do not take to bear on the truth of the belief, and "if this is granted, it follows that you cannot believe that someone will do something for reasons that you do not take to bear on whether that person will. Since reasons that show trust good, important, etc., do not bear on whether the person in question will do the thing in question, one cannot trustingly believe that someone will do something for reasons that show trust good, important, etc." (ibid., 215).

This same sort of reasoning has led others to conclude that trust and belief must come apart, but Hieronymi argues, instead, that what is called trust without belief is not "the full-fledged and primary sort of trust." In discussing Holton's trust circle example, she points out there is a difference between the belief that you will be caught and entrusting in the face of doubt. I agree, and this worry supports my view that when I actually trust, I must have reached a certain level of confidence. I disagree, however, that one cannot fully trust even when one has some doubts. Hieronymi seems committed to the idea that belief and doubt are completely incompatible, as we see further in her example (which needs to be updated in the era of ubiquitous cellphones) concerning whether you keep a date to meet me at a restaurant when you begin to harbor doubts about whether I will show up. Hieronymi argues that this doubt is incompatible with trust: "When I show up, you tell me of your anxiety and your subsequent decision to come to the restaurant, even in the face of your doubts. Upon hearing your story, I am less impressed with your overcoming your doubt by your decision to 'trust' me and more concerned with the lack of trust expressed in the doubt itself. Certainly your actions are somehow more trusting than those of someone who, in the face of such doubt, did not come to the restaurant at all. Nevertheless, I could rightly complain that your lack of confidence betrays a lack of trust" (ibid., 218).

It is not at all clear in this case that you don't believe I will be at the restaurant. The idea that belief requires feeling certain, though widespread in epistemology, is contentious. And it is in just those instances where the evidence is inconclusive, and according to the strict evidentialist, the proper doxastic attitude is suspension, where value-related reasons can support both believing and trusting.[13]

Thomas Simpson has recently endorsed the view that the only reasons to trust are those that bear on the likelihood of the trusted being trustworthy, and asks us to consider the following example to support his view:

> *Antarctic Resupply*. Lief is preparing to trek to the South Pole alone, pulling his food and equipment with him on a sledge. He is aiming to break the record for the fastest unsupported journey. The weight of his sledge would jeopardize the attempt if it had provisions for the return journey as well. So Katherine—an

> old Antarctic hand who runs an adventure support company promises that she will be contactable via satellite phone. When called, she will drop by parachute a package of supplies at the Pole, and they arrange a contingency plan if communications should fail. If Katherine does not follow the plan, it is all but certain that Lief will die. Lief is very keen to survive the expedition. He sets out south. (Simpson 2017, 177)

Simpson argues that Lief trusts Katherine and that "in trusting her, he should come to a judgement about whether Katherine will follow the plan. In coming to this judgement, he should take account of all and only those epistemic reasons that bear on the likelihood of her fulfilment of his trust; that is, his total evidence as to whether she is trustworthy" (ibid.). Simpson does not argue that this evidentialist constraint always holds, but he does think it holds frequently and in important contexts. He is thus more open than is Hieronymi to there being cases that count as even "full-fledged" trust where non-evidential reasons can be supportive. Ultimately, he is skeptical of there being univocal meaning to trust and "because there are different forms of trust, so there are different rational relations" (ibid., 184). I will return to the idea of there being different kinds of trust in section 4.

It is worth noting that both Simpson and Jones appeal to high-stakes cases to support very different views. In cases of life and death like the one Simpson appeals to, trusting without sufficient evidence that the one trusted is trustworthy cannot be right. But remember, those who argue that it can be reasonable or justified trust for non-evidential reasons are not committed to it always being so. Jones argues that it is when the stakes are high that one should not let the evidence settle the matter if one still finds feelings pointing in the other direction.

In surveying the wide variety of accounts of trust on offer, Simpson considers what he calls "cognitive non-evidentialism." While I do not want to embrace this title for the view I defend, what he articulates as the motivation for such views describes mine as well. Exponents of this view are

> impressed by the need for belief that trust often seems to involve. It is not just that the trustor acts as if she believes that the trusted will be trustworthy; rather, she actually believes that he is. It is that belief which constitutes the trust. They are also impressed by the moral dimensions of trust, such that interpersonal relationships ground the resulting belief, and this not merely through the epistemically uncontroversial process of giving privileged access to evidence. Cognitive non-evidentialism thus seeks to endorse both claims simultaneously. (Ibid., 182)

He wonders how such a view is possible, but it is not problematic if one recognizes that at times one can have genuine value-related reasons for belief. I will now turn to this way of addressing the initial puzzle.

REJECT (III): THERE CAN BE GOOD NON-EVIDENTIAL REASONS FOR BELIEF

The following case helps to remind us of the plausibility of both (i) and (ii).

Suppose that your lover has been unfaithful to you. But suppose also that he or she is contrite and repenting and makes a reasonable case that it will not happen again. For instance, your lover was cunningly seduced when he or she succumbed to temptation, or there are some mitigating circumstances. You are seriously considering whether you can see past the betrayal. As you are discussing reconciliation, your lover says to you, "I will be faithful to you, I promise" and thereby sincerely and resolutely expresses his or her commitment (Marušić 2015, 264–65).

What would it mean to trust in this case but not to believe? If I tell you sincerely that I will keep my word and you say you trust me even though you don't believe me, I would have a hard time understanding you. Not being believed in such a scenario is a terrible feeling, and it is the same terrible feeling as not being trusted.

But if you do believe in such a case, you are believing even while recognizing clear evidence against your belief. There is a difference, for example, between a bookie assessing the odds and deciding that it is worth betting on whether your lover will keep their word, and *you* trusting them to keep their word. In this case, you have important non-evidential reasons to believe that the bookie lacks. Namely, you have reasons that stem from the value of your relationship that take into account that you *love* your lover. If you simply base your belief on the evidence of your lover's trustworthiness, as the bookie would, there is something wrong with your response. As McGeer notes, trust differs from such mere predictions and "neglects or abjures such strategic judgements" (McGeer 2008, 240).

As we saw above, cases of this kind motivate the view that trusting is not believing, but I propose, instead, that we see trust as one example, among many, of states that we pre-reflectively think of as beliefs but that don't behave in the way that the dominant philosophical view of belief says they must. Despite differences in the way beliefs are characterized, it is commonly held that (i) beliefs are evidence-sensitive, meaning that they are revisable in the face of counterevidence, and (ii) beliefs are connected to actions such that actions can be explained by what one believes, and inferences can be made about what one believes by how one acts.

Given such a view, many argue that if a mental state fails to respond to evidence or doesn't result in the kind of behavior typical or expected of belief, it is not a belief after all, but a different state. Yet, one finds seeming counterexamples of resilient beliefs that fail to respond to evidence, or that do not connect to action in the way we would expect them to. Consider the following: Anna, who suffers from Capgras syndrome, believes her husband is an impostor even though she has no evidence for it and much against it; she also fails to take the kind of actions one would expect with such a belief such as running away or calling the authorities. Balthasar believes the glass skywalk is safe and yet trembles as he tries to walk on it. Chakrapani believes that their lover will keep their promise to not betray them again even though past evidence indicates that they will, and David believes that the God as described in the Bible exists, though he is aware of the evidence suggesting that such a God does not exist and claims his reasons for believing are not based in evidence.

In all these cases, the subjects have beliefs that either (i) are misaligned with their actions, or (ii) recognize that the evidence does not support their beliefs, or both. Two responses are common in the face of such examples, which are often tied together. The first is to deny that these states, which we pre-reflectively call "beliefs," really are beliefs—that is, to put restrictions on what counts as a belief so that these are no longer counterexamples. Just as we have seen that many philosophers deny that trusting someone requires believing them, they also deny that delusions are beliefs, and that religious cognitive attitudes are beliefs. Recent discussions extend this idea to include political "beliefs," claiming they are not actually beliefs.[14] The second is to introduce unfamiliar mental states to account for what is going on in these kinds of cases. Suggestions for what to call these problematic states include "quasi-beliefs," "in-between beliefs," "aliefs," "besires," and "bimagination."

I propose instead that we view these examples as exposing that this dominant view of belief is overly narrow and that we explore ways of theorizing about belief that does not force us to exclude states as *real* beliefs that we pre-reflectively think of as beliefs, and does not require us to "outsource" the work belief seems to do to other mental states. A few recent discussions have recognized a similar problem and have tried to address it. For example, Ganapini (2020) and Helton (2020) recognize that the dominant view is at risk of depopulating the category of belief in a problematic way. My preferred way of addressing the problem is to conceive of beliefs as kinds of emotions, where emotions contain both cognitive and noncognitive elements.[15] And so I agree with both Jones and Hieronymi: trust is an affective attitude and also a belief. While such a view of belief is unorthodox in the philosophical literature, one does find endorsements of the idea that the function of belief is more complex than accurately representing the environment. For example,

Ryan McKay and Daniel Dennett (2009) describe the purpose of belief as going beyond the simple tracking of truth: "Belief states have complex effects beyond simply informing our deliberations—they flavor our attitudes and feed our self-images—and complex causes that can create ancillary effects, such as triggering emotional adjustments and immune reactions," and Catherine Elgin states that "believing that *p*, is not just an affirmative orientation to the content that *p*. It is a complex orientation to those aspects of the world to which the question whether or not *p* is relevant" (Elgin 2008, 45). Reflection on trust and other problematic states should push us to explore belief's complexity.

OTHER RESPONSES

I will close by considering two other ways of responding to the puzzle. As mentioned above, one might, as Simpson does, deny that there is any univocal meaning of "trust." Perhaps there are many different kinds of trust; Simpson contends that "trust functions as an umbrella term that may refer to a variety of mental attitudes that, while non-identical, nonetheless share a range of similar features" (Simpson 2017, 184). One finds references in discussions of trust to *epistemic* trust contrasted with the *affective* kind, often taking it as obvious that these are different states.[16]

My worry about the idea of a *purely* epistemic trust is that it is hard to see what would differentiate it from mere reliance. Remember that trusting makes us vulnerable to the one trusted. If belief only arises after one attends to the evidence and sees it as supporting the likelihood of truth, how does a *trusting* belief differ from a mere prediction? Hieronymi recognizes that this is the biggest challenge for her account, and only gestures at possible ways of addressing it.

Finally, one may attempt to dissolve the puzzle by arguing that we can evaluate along different normative dimensions and, once we do so, we see that while fit-related reasons for trusting are only evidential, we can also recognize that value-related reasons for trusting include non-evidential considerations. Perhaps Hiernonymi is right that it is only *fitting* to trust when it is also only *fitting* to believe that the person is trustworthy, but we can recognize that there are also value-related reasons to trust. So what we would say in a case where one trusts against the evidence is that the trust in not fitting but it is valuable.

We have seen that various theorists refer to trust being "justified," "reasonable," or "rational." Those urging us to distinguish between these different kinds of reasons want to resist the idea that we can use this language without clarifying which normative dimension concerns us.[17] On one hand, I can

embrace this move, but then we should also be prepared to admit that a belief can fail to be fitting but that we can have value-related reasons to hold it. While such a view is gaining some adherents, it is still met with much resistance. On the other hand, this proposal might just stall the question that has concerned us. The fittingness view tells us it is fitting to trust someone who merits trust or who is worthy of trust. But how do we decide when one merits trust? It is not clear that the fittingness conditions must only refer to the credibility of the proposition that the person is trustworthy. And finally, we may well want some criteria to appeal to in figuring out whether we *ought* to trust, which this strict separation of kinds of reasons has a hard time accommodating. Evaluating trust, in a way that's truly informative, always involves the messy business of weighing reasons of various dimensions.[18]

CONCLUSION

The idea that it can be "rational" or "justified" to trust in cases where the evidence is lacking that the person is trustworthy have led many to conclude that trusting someone to do something does not mean you must believe that they will do that thing. I have argued that for trust to differ from mere reliance, or from hope, it needs to be a belief. Yet, I do not deny that sometimes we ought to trust even if we lack sufficient evidence that the person is trustworthy. What this reveals is that there are also times when we ought to believe even if we lack sufficient evidence.[19]

NOTES

1. Guy Longworth extends and defends what he argues is Kant's view that it can sometimes be reasonable to hold things true on practical, rather than evidential, grounds, but thinks it is important to distinguish such practically based holdings-true from beliefs: "Insofar as one has a conception of belief as governed by evidence, one has a reason not to conflate holding things true for practical purposes with holding things true for theoretical purposes" (Longworth 2017, 264). Others who argue that trust can come without belief include Darwall 2017; Holton 1994; Hawley 2014; Jones 1996; and McGeer 2008; some of whose views I discuss below.

2. See McGeer 2008 for a detailed discussion of the way trust can empower others. She discusses, among other cases, "the oft cited example of parents deciding to trust their teenagers with the house or family car, believing that their offspring may well abuse their trust, but hoping by such trust to elicit, in the fullness of time, more responsible and responsive trustworthy behaviour. . . . Trust, in this case, does not depend on any comfortable feelings of optimism or confidence concerning those whom we trust but is characterized instead by explicitly imposing on them certain

normative expectations—expectations that they should, even if they do not, live up to the trust we have invested in them" (McGeer 2008, 241).

3. See Domenicucci and Holton 2017 for a defense of this view. They also appeal to linguistic data to support the idea that trust be thought of centrally as a two-place relation: "In English, as we have accepted, the three-place construction with an infinitival third component is completely natural. But in core Romance languages—Latin, Italian, French—it is not readily available. In French, 'J'ai confiance en toi pour x' is colloquial but not in the dictionaries; In Italian 'Ho fiducia in te per x' is simply unacceptable as is the equivalent in Latin 'Fidem habeo alicui ut X'" (Domenicucci and Holton 2017, 150).

4. This is not to say that people do not have those feelings: I may want to kick the chair which I stubbed my toe on or yell at the car that doesn't start when I really need it to. Here is a vivid representation of such a case: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mv0onXhyLlE. The reason why it is funny to see Basil thrashing his car in this video is precisely because there is something misguided in this reaction. Thinking about how we "trust" objects also points to a distinction between the attitude of trusting and the act of "entrusting." At times, we may have no choice but to act in a trusting manner even when we lack the attitude.

5. As Karen Jones (2017) has pointed out, if I trust you and you don't come through, then I can appropriately complain, "But I was counting on you!" She explores when and why this complaint has normative force to help understand the nature and norms of trust.

6. Annette Baier (1986) uses the example of Kant's daily walk to illustrate the difference between trust and reliance. Kant's neighbors rely on Kant's regular habits to tell the time of day, but it would not be appropriate for them to feel betrayed if he altered the time of his walk one day.

7. Jones has modified her view over the years, but the core idea that to trust is to count on has remained intact.

8. For a recent defense of the idea that reasons for emotions can diverge from reasons for beliefs and that emotions can play an indispensable epistemic role, see Silva (ms.)

9. This story about the boatman and the fog is one that Ram Dass frequently tells.

10. See Leary 2017; McCormick 2015; McCormick 2017; McCormick 2019; Reisner 2009; Reisner 2014; Rinard 2015; Rinard 2018; Rinard 2019; Sullivan-Bissett 2018; Way 2016.

11. In McCormick 2017 I offer conditions for when hope is "rational."

12. See Hieronymi 2005.

13. See Moon 2018 for an extensive defense of the view that belief and doubt are compatible. Hawthorne et al. 2016 and Rothschild 2020 argue that much linguistic data supports the view that the way we ordinarily use the word "belief" supports the idea that believing something only requires thinking it likely. While Jane Friedman's (2019) influential work on inquiry argues that belief comes at the end of inquiry, and that something like suspension and judgment is required when one is in doubt, Feldman and Conee 2018 have argued, and I agree, that one can still inquire further into a proposition believed. "Upon completing one's tax returns one might believe fairly

confidently that a small refund is due. However, one might nevertheless decide to double check or to ask another person to review the return, given the potential consequences of filing an erroneous return. Hence, one believes that one will get a refund but one is also in an inquiring state of mind, at least in the sense that one seeks additional information on the topic. In general, one can actively seek to alleviate residual doubts about things one does. This is especially common when the beliefs concern matters with important practical consequences" (Feldman and Conee 2018, 73–74).

14. Recently, Michael Hannon and Jeroen de Ridder have argued that most so-called political beliefs are not genuine beliefs for similar reasons. They say, for example: "In general, deeply held political beliefs seem unresponsive to evidence, driven by affect, and formed on largely non-evidential grounds. . . . For these reasons, political beliefs (and other identity-constitutive beliefs) seem to be a different cognitive attitude than many ordinary world-modelling beliefs. In politics, we often care more about belonging and team loyalty than truth because, for many, politics is not really about truth" (Hannon and Ridder 2021, 158).

15. I argue for this view in "Belief as Emotion" (forthcoming in *Philosophical Issues* 32). An extended discussion will also be forthcoming in *Belief as Emotion* (Oxford University Press).

16. See, for example, Wallbank and Reisner 2020.

17. See Howard 2019a and Howard 2019b for a defense of the claim that these normative dimensions are distinct and that it is important to attend to this distinction.

18. Some may accept the view that these normative dimensions are incommensurable. This seems to be Richard Feldman's conclusion in his discussion of the ethics of belief. There is no meaningful question of how I ought to believe (or trust?) simpliciter: "We've disambiguated 'ought' and we can't put the various senses back together again" (Feldman 2000, 694).

19. Versions of this chapter were presented to CRÉ (ethics research center) at Université de Montréal, The Ethics Working Group at the University of Richmond, and at the Graduate Epistemology Conference at the University of Rochester. Thanks to all who attended these presentations for their thoughtful questions and comments. Thanks to Kevin Cherry, Jules Salamone, Richard Feldman, and Mark Alfano for comments on an earlier draft. Work on this chapter was completed while I was a visiting researcher at CRÉ and GRIN at the Université de Montréal.

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